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COMPENSATION OF PROMOTERS
DIGST-NoT.
(Van Zandt v. St. Louis Wholesale Grocer Co., 190 S. W. 1050, Mo.
App.)
X attempted to interest a Grocers' Association in the formation
of a corporative wholesale grocer company, in which the retail grocers
were to be the stockholders. He stated that his compensation for
organizing this corporation would be a specific amount on each sub-
scription of five shares obtained by him, and a certain per cent. of the
gross sales of the Company during the first five years of its incorpora-
tion. The proposal was rejected by the Association and X interested
certain persons in the proposed corporation. A "paper association"
was organized and "paper officers" were selected. The Company was
incorporated.
A controversy arose between the promoter, the "paper officers"
and the corporation, relative to the compensation X was to receive.
X claimed that he was to receive in addition to a stated compensation
per subscription, one-half of one per centum of the gross sales of the
Company during the first five years. The "paper officers" and the
corporation claimed that this compensation of one-half of one per
centum of the gross sales was not considered in the promoter's pro-
posal to them, and that it was agreed between the parties he was to
receive a stated amount per subscription.
Suit was instituted and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff
and against the corporation. The cause was appealed and the Appel-
late Court held that the evidence did not disclose an agreement as
contended by X, and, further, that a corporation is only liable for the
services of a promoter rendered to it when those services are adopted by
the corporation after its formation; that services rendered by a pro-
moter in obtaining subscriptions to stock in a corporation are of a
different nature, and are governed by a different rule than the services
of an attorney in drawing up the articles of association and the serv-
ices of an attorney in connection with the same; that the adoption by
the corporation of the acts of the promoter must be signified by some
action other than the mere act of becoming a corporate body; that the
mere act of becoming a corporate body is not an act showing an adop-
tion of these services so as to bind the corporation and make it liable to
compensate the promoters for obtaining the subscription to its stock.
That the promoters of a corporation do not have the power to pledge
the corporation to a payment for services in procuring subscriptions
to the capital stock of the Company, when they do not constitute a
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majority of the subscribers; that the stockholders who pay a fair price
for their stock without knowledge as to an agreement to compensate
a promoter, or incumber the corporate assets by an agreement to com-
pensate a promoter, take their stock free from such an encumbrance;
that to allow compensation to a promoter by reason of the acts of other
promoters would allow the encumbrance on the corporate assets to such
an extent that it might "kill" the organization at its start.
This case limits the rule laid down in Taussig v. Railroad Com-
pany, 166 Mo. 28, 186 Mo. 269, where the court apparently said that,
when the promoter rendered services under such circumstances as to
imply that the parties expected or ought to have expected that com-
pensation should be paid, the promoter or officer is entiled to receive
compensation.
The Taussig case as limited by the Van Zandt case above, allows
recovery by a promoter for the sale of visible tangible property which
the corporation accepts and uses, and for services other than obtain-
ing stock subscriptions when such property or services are adopted by
acts of the corporation other than merely becoming a corporate en-
tity. This is a proper limitation on the Taussig case, and allows the
corporation to accept the benefits of contracts made in its behalf by
only assuming such burdens as necessarily follow the contract, and not
independent burdens which do not appear on the face of the contract.
Some courts have allowed compensation for services similar to
those rendered in the Van Zandt case, on the theory that the corpora-
tion by accepting the benefits of a contract, must assume the burdens,
and that one of the burdens is the compensation of the promoters.
The fallacy of this reasoning is that the corporation by accepting the
stock subscriptions, makes a contract with the subscriber to the stock,
and the promoter does not appear in this contract, so that his com-
pensation is not a burden incident to the contract.
The Van Zandt case does not deny recovery to the promoter, where
he appears as a contracting party. This should be the true test in all
cases relative to promoter's compensation, viz.: his appearance as
a contracting party. Thus a corporation will be informed of the claims
of the promoter when accepting the benefits of contracts made for it
by promoters.
The Van Zandt case while not discussing the cum onere doctrine
as described in 7 R. C. L., page 75, nevertheless indicates that the
citation of the Taussig case there made is ill advised.
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